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IF AT FIRST YOU DO SUCCEED: JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
IN NEW MEXICO'S STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
MICHAEL D. MOBERLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine' that may prevent a litigant from taking
inconsistent positions in legal proceedings.2 As a general proposition, the doctrine
prohibits a party who obtains judicial relief by asserting one position from
subsequently assuming a contrary position to the prejudice of its adversary.' The
rationale for this prohibition is that a party who obtains a benefit by asserting a
particular position4 is properly charged with the burden of assuming that position
as well.'
The goal of the doctrine, which courts also refer to as the doctrine of preclusion
against inconsistent positions6 and, occasionally, estoppel by oath,7 is to protect the

* B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix, Arizona;
Chairman, Arizona Agricultural Employment Relations Board; Editor, The Arizona LaborLetter.
1. See EEOC v. MTS Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1503, 1511 (D.N.M. 1996) (describing the application of
judicial estoppel as a matter of "equitable discretion"). A federal court in South Carolina has described the doctrine:
As a shield to protect the integrity of the courts, the doctrine is an instrument of the courts, not
of the parties, and thus invoked at the court's discretion, as the equities of the case demand. As
an equitable doctrine, judicial estoppel escapes ironclad characterization and rigid application,
and its application hinges on the facts of each particular suit.
Hindman v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 947 F. Supp. 215, 221 (D.S.C. 1996) (citations omitted).
2. See Citizens Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving Co., 89 N.M. 360, 366, 552 P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App.
1976). See generallyPatriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1 st Cir. 1987) ("In broad
outline, the doctrine precludes a party from asserting a position in one legal proceeding which is contrary to a
position it has already asserted in another.").
3. See United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387,390 (10th Cir. 1986) (observing that "judicial
estoppel bar[s] a party from presenting an inconsistent assertion in subsequent litigation only if that party
succeeded in the earlier litigation."); Rodriguez v. La Mesilla Constr. Co., 123 N.M. 489, 494, 943 P.2d 136, 141
(CL App. 1997) ("Judicial estoppel... prevents a party who has successfully assumed a certain position in judicial
proceedings from then assuming an inconsistent position, especially if doing so prejudices a party who had
acquiesced in the former position.").
4. See Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that the receipt of
"a benefit from the previously taken position" may be critical to the application of judicial estoppel).
5. See United States v. Levasseur, 846 F.2d 786, 793 (ist Cir. 1988) (concluding that judicial estoppel
precludes a litigant who has obtained a litigation benefit as the result of a prior representation from avoiding the
"condign burden" of that representation); see also State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Civil Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 509
P.2d 725, 731 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973):
The essence ofjudicial estoppel is that a party has gained an advantage--obtained judicial relief-in one action by asserting one position, and that in view of his having gained that advantage,
he must accept the burdens of that position in any subsequent litigation between the same
parties involving the same issue.
(emphasis omitted).
6. See Ellis v. Arkansas L& Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436,440-41 (10th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.,
911 F. Supp. 1351, 1360 (D. Kan. 1995), af'd, 138 F.3d 1304 (10 Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 158 F.3d 1060
(10th Cir. 1998).
7. See Lesser v. Allums, 918 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tex. App. 1996); Lassiter v. District of Columbia, 447 A.2d
456, 461 (D.C. 1982); Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 266 S.W. 313, 317-18 (Tenn. 1924), But cf. Scott v. Land
Span Motor, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1115, 1120 n.4 (D.S.C. 1991) ("Estoppel by oath is a more harsh doctrine than is
judicial estoppel .... ). See generally Mark J. Plumer, Note, JudicialEstoppel: The Refurbishingof a Judicial
Shield, 55 GEO. WASH. L REV. 409, 410 n.8 (1987) ("Judicial estoppel presently appears under a variety of names,
especially in state courts. It is frequently called the doctrine of preclusion against inconsistent positions. Less
frequently courts refer to the doctrine as estoppel by oath.") (citations omitted).
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integrity of the judicial process' by barring litigants from changing their positions
to the detriment of their adversaries. 9 By preventing litigants from playing fast and
loose with the judicial system,' judicial estoppel enables courts to protect
themselves from manipulation."
Despite this laudable purpose, the judicial estoppel doctrine has not been readily
accepted, 2 having generally received a poor reception outside of Tennessee," a
where it originated. 4 Indeed, for many years Tennessee was the only state that
recognized the doctrine," and it continues to be the only jurisdiction in which the
assertion of virtually any prior position in a judicial proceeding can estop the
subsequent assertion of a contrary position. 6

8. See 49.01 Acres ofLand, 802 F.2d at 390; Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146,
1177 (D.S.C. 1974).
9. The New Mexico Court of Appeals has indicated that application of judicial estoppel is particularly
appropriate where the assertion of an inconsistent position would be "to the prejudice of [a] party who has
acquiesced in the position formerly taken." Citizens Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving Co., 89 N.M. 360, 366, 552
P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App. 1976) (citations omitted).
10. See El Paso Prod. Co. v. PWG Partnership, 116 N.M. 583, 587, 866 P.2d 311,315 (1993); Citizens
Bank, 89 N.M. at 366, 552 P.2d at 802. For a collection of cases using the term "fast and loose," which is the most
common characterization of the litigant behavior precluded by the doctrine, see Douglas W. Henkin, Comment,
JudicialEstoppel-BeatingShields into Swords and Back Again, 139 U. PA. L REV. 1711, 1724 n.78 (1991). Other
courts have characterized the purpose of the doctrine in equally colorful terms. See Colleton Reg'l Hosp. v. MRS
Med. Review Sys., 866 F. Supp. 896, 900 (D.S.C. 1994) (preventing litigants from "blowing hot and cold");
Duplan Corp., 397 F. Supp. at 1177 (precluding parties from "having [their] cake and eat[ing] it too"); Martin v.
Wood, 229 P.2d 710, 712 (Ariz. 1951) (preventing parties from doing "about face[s]"); Roberts v. Grogan, 21
S.E.2d 829, 830 (N.C. 1942) (precluding litigants from "swap[ping] horses in midstream"). See generallyOtis
specially concurring)
Elevator Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 447 P.2d 879, 886 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968) (Molloy, J.,
(discussing various "picturesque but essentially inexact" characterizations of the doctrine).
11. See Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343,94 F.3d 597,603 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Prilliman
v. United Airlines, Inc., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 155-56 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Rissetto). See generally Ashley S.
Deeks, Comment, Raising the Cost of Lying: Rethinking Eriefor JudicialEstoppel,64 U. CMt.L REV. 873, 873-74
").
(1997) ("The doctrine empowers courts... to constrain litigants' manipulations of the judicial process ....
12. See Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that
"some circuits and jurisdictions have never recognized the doctrine"); Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Davis, 822 F.2d 734,
737 n.6 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that "the doctrine is not followed in a majority of jurisdictions"); Konstantinidis
v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933,938 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[Jjudicial estoppel has not been followed by anything approaching
a majority of jurisdictions, nor is there a discernible modem trend in that direction.").
13. See Konstantinidis,626 F.2d at 938; Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432,437-38 (10th Cir. 1956)
(stating that the doctrine "has encountered inhospitable reception outside the state of Tennessee"); cf.Hatten Realty
Co. v. Baylies, 290 P. 561, 568 (Wyo. 1930) (concluding that "the Tennessee courts probably go too far" in
applying judicial estoppel).
14. The origins of the doctrine are actually somewhat in dispute. Some courts have concluded that the
doctrine originated in the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680 (1895). See AFN, Inc. v.
Schlott, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 219, 224 (D.NJ. 1992); In re 815 Walnut Assocs., 183 B.R. 423, 429 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1995). Most courts and commentators trace its origins to Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39 (1857),
a Tennessee state court decision in which the plaintiff was estopped from maintaining a position inconsistent with
one he had asserted under oath in a previous judicial proceeding. See Paschke v. Retool Indus., 519 N.W.2d 441,
444 (Mich. 1994) (discussing Hamilton); see also Van Deusen v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 514 S.W.2d 951,
956 (Tex. App. 1974) ('This doctrine ofjudicial estoppel arose and was developed in the courts of Tennessee.").
Indeed, there is some question as to whether the judicial estoppel doctrine was even at issue in Davis. See Deeks,
supra note 11, at 877 n.15 (noting that some courts "believe that Davis represents an example of equitable
estoppel') (emphasis added).
15. See Vendig v. Traylor, 604 S.W.2d 424,429 ('rex. App. 1980) ("At the time of its adoption in Texas
[in 1956] the doctrine had been recognized only by the courts of Tennessee."). For a discussion of the doctrine's
early application in Tennessee, see T.H. Malone, The Tennessee Law of JudicialEstoppel, 1 TENN. L REV. 1
(1922).
16. See USIEFE Corp. v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 560 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Tex. 1983); Rand G. Boyers,
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One prevalent objection to the doctrine has been that it deprives courts of
adversarial presentations," thus undermining the truth-seeking function of the
judicial process."8 The doctrine is also potentially at odds with modem liberal
pleading practices that contemplate the assertion of alternative and inconsistent
positions. 9 While these issues have been of little concern to some courts,2 ° they
have prompted others to apply the doctrine sparingly" or, in some cases, not at all.2
New Mexico is among the states that, recognize judicial estoppel. 23 However,
federal courts in New Mexico (and elsewhere in the Tenth Circuit) have generally
been unreceptive to the doctrine.' This article considers the consequences of these
divergent views and alerts practitioners to their tactical implications.25 Part II of the
article discusses a number of state and federal cases in New Mexico that have

Comment, PrecludingInconsistentStatements: The Doctrine of JudicialEstoppel, 80 Nw. U. L REV. 1244, 124546 (1986); Henkin, supra note 10, at 1713. See generally United States v. Certain Land and Interests in Property,
225 F. Supp. 338, 340 (M.D. Ten. 1964) ("Tennessee is apparently a minority of one in its particular application
of the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel ...").
17. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bowers v. Superior Court, 839 P.2d 454,458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that
the application ofjudicial estoppel "would effectively rob this court of an adversarial presentation"); Deeks, supra
note 11, at 877 (stating that judicial estoppel "potentially prevents a case from proceeding on the merits"); Henkin,
supra note 10, at 1714 (observing that the application of judicial estoppel "will more often than not result in a
litigant's entire case being thrown out").
18. See United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1986) ("[A]doption of judicial
estoppel... would discourage the determination of cases on the basis of the true facts as they might be established
ultimately.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218
(6th Cir. 1990) (indicating that the application of judicial estoppel can "imping[e] on the truth-seeking function
of the court because the doctrine precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either
statement"); American Methyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 749 F.2d 826, 833 n. 44 (D.C. Ci.
1984) (observing that judicial estoppel is "at odds with the truth-seeking function of courts of law"); Deeks, supra
note 11, at 881 ("Applying judicial estoppel will frustrate the general freedom courts afford litigants in presenting
their cases, a freedom our adversarial system assumes will best reveal the truth."); Henkin, supra note 10, at 171314 ("The doctrine may ...impede the truth-seeking purpose of the judicial system....").
19. See Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 214 (1stCir. 1987) ("An objection
to the classic [judicial estoppel] doctrine has been that it reflects the now-abandoned strict rules of pleading.");
Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 714 (Wyo. 1993) (noting that "the liberal modern pleading riles" permit
"inconsistency in pleading"); Henkin, supra note 10, at 1716 (describing the "practice of permitting inconsistent
and alternative pleading" as "now almost universally accepted").
20. See Teledyne Indus., 911 F.2d at 1217 n.3 (concluding that "judicial estoppel does not clash with the
right to plead inconsistent claims"); Fay v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 647 N.E.2d 422,426 n.10 (Mass. 1995)
(concluding that the judicial estoppel doctrine does not conflict with the right to plead inconsistently).
21. See Paschke v. Retool Indus., 519 N.W.2d 441,444 n.4 (Mich. 1994) (advocating the application of
judicial estoppel in a manner "narrowly tailored to allow for alternative pleadings"); Teledyne Indus., 911 F.2d at
1218 ("Judicial estoppel is applied with caution to avoid impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court
because the doctrine precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement.").
22. See, e.g., Bowers, 839 P.2d at 458 (inappropriate in plea agreement dispute); Konstantinidis v. Chen,
626 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("No District of Columbia court has ever adopted the judicial estoppel
doctrine.").
23. See Citizens Bank v. C & H Constr.& Paving Co., 89 N.M. 360, 366, 552 P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App.
1976). See generally Paschke, 519 N.W.2d at 444 (observing that "the doctrine has been adopted by most state
and federal courts, in slightly varying forms").
24. TIbs is in contrast to the view now held by many federal courts. See Scott v. Land Span Motor, Inc., 781
F. Supp. 1115, 1119 (D.S.C. 1991) (stating that "judicial estoppel is recognized in several federal circuits").
25. There has been no prior academic consideration of New Mexico's view of judicial estoppel. For a
discussion of a neighboring state's approach to the doctrine, see Roger M. Baron & Melissa M. Martin, The
Application of Judicial Estoppel in Texas, 41 BAYLOR L REv. 447 (1989). For the author's own recent
consideration of the doctrine's application in another federal jurisdiction, see Michael D. Moberly, Playing "Fast
andLoose" orJust Fast?:A Look at JudicialEstoppel in the Ninth Circuit,33 GONZ. L REV. 171 (1997).
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examined the doctrine.' Parts I and IV examine some frequently litigated judicial
estoppel issues,27 including whether prior judicial success is a prerequisite to the
doctrine's application.' Part V explores the interplay between judicial estoppel and
modem liberal pleading rules,29 including specifically Rule 1-008(E)(2) of the New
Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure3" and its federal counterpart,3 ' Rule 8(e)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.32 The article ultimately concludes that the
majority view of judicial estoppel (New Mexico's version), which applies the
doctrine only when the party against whom it is invoked has successfully asserted
a previously inconsistent position, is the best form of the doctrine. This form is
more easily reconciled with procedural rules and does more to ease the concerns
that parties may be unfairly manipulating the court proceedings. 3
II. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IN THE NEW MEXICO COURTS
A. The Doctrine'sApplication in the State Courts
The New Mexico Court of Appeals has characterized estoppel as "the preclusion,
by acts or conduct, from asserting a right which might otherwise have existed, to the
detriment and prejudice of another, who, in reliance on such acts and conduct, has
acted thereon."' However, the same court has also indicated that judicial estoppel
is not a genuine estoppel as that term is ordinarily defined. 5 Instead, judicial

26. See infra notes 34-113 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 114-88 and accompanying text.
28. The prior success requirement appears to be the most commonly litigated judicial estoppel issue. See,
e.g., AFN, Inc. v. Schlott, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 219, 224-25 (D.N.J. 1992):
If there is an uncertain aspect of the doctrine of judicial estoppel it is whether a party can be
estopped only when its inconsistent assertion was actually adopted by the court in the prior
action or at least was successfully maintained in that action without necessarily having been
judicially adopted, or whether the offending party need only have played "fast and loose" with
the court even if ultimately unsuccessful in the prior action.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The majority view is that the doctrine only applies if the party against whom it is invoked successfully asserted
a previously inconsistent position. See Arizona v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 305 (Ariz. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1128 (1997). For a brief academic discussion of the majority view, see Deeks, supra note 11, at 876-78. The
minority view is that the doctrine can be invoked whenever a party wants to assert inconsistent positions. See
Towery, 920 P.2d at 305 n.13. For a previous discussion of the minority view, see Deeks, supra note 11, at 878-79.
New Mexico is a majority view jurisdiction. See Citizens Bank, 89 N.M. at 366, 552 P.2d at 802.
29. See infra notes 189-223 and accompanying text.
30. Officially cited as N.M. R. CIv. P. 1-008(E)(2).
31. For previous discussions of the judicial estoppel doctrine's relationship with the federal nule, see Henkin,
supra note 10, at 1736-43, and Plumer, supra note 7, at 417-26.
32. Officially cited as FED. R. CIrv. P. 8(e)(2).
33. See infra notes 224-58 and accompanying text.
34. C & H Constr. & Paving Co. v. Citizens Bank, 93 N.M. 150, 162, 597 P.2d 1190, 1202 (Ct. App. 1979)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
35. See Citizens Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving Co., 89 N.M. 360, 366, 552 P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App.
1976), modified on othergrounds sub nom. State ex rel. Citizen's Bank v. Fowlie, 90 N.M. 208, 561 P.2d 481
(1977); cf Woods v. Woods, 638 S.W.2d 403,405 (Tean. Ct. App. 1982) ("Judicial estoppel is, strictly speaking,
not a true estoppel."); Long v. Knox, 291 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1956) ("Judicial estoppel is not strictly speaking
estoppel at all but arises from positive rules of procedure based on justice and sound public policy."). See generally
Scioto Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n v. Price Waterhouse & Co., No. 90AP-1 124, 1993 WL 531298, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 21, 1993) ("It is somewhat difficult to understand the use of the word 'estoppel' in this [context] since the
equitable doctrine of estoppel is predicated upon reliance by another entity to its detriment, not as punishment to

Winter 1999]

JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL

estoppel is a form of "quasi estoppel"' that resists precise definition,37 but generally
prevents parties from "playing fast and loose with the courts by contradicting a
or previous testimony during a course of litigation or during a
previous position"n,,38
subsequent action.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals first considered judicial estoppel as an
independent doctrine 39 in Citizens Bank v. C & H Construction & Paving Co. in
1976.' The case involved an action on a bank loan in which the borrowers were
awarded judgment on a fraud claim against the lender. The claim arose, in part,
from the lender's having obtained the appointment of a receiver to collect the
4
borrowers' accounts receivable after the borrowers defaulted on their loan. On
appeal, the lender argued that the borrowers were precluded from recovering
damages attributable to the receiver's appointment because they had consented to
42
the appointment during previous preliminary injunction proceedings. In holding

a party for asserting a position which he later determines to abandon."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 659 N.E.2d
1268 (Ohio 1996) (plurality opinion) (Sweeney, J.) (affirming in part and reversing in part without mention of the
estoppel issue).
36. Woods, 638 S.W.2d at 406; see also Rosa v. CWJ Contractors, Ltd., 664 P.2d 745, 751 n.12 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1983) (describing judicial estoppel as a doctrine falling "[w]ithin quasi-estoppel"). Like judicial estoppel,
the quasi estoppel doctrine "precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with
a position previously taken by him." Clontz v. Fortner, 399 P.2d 949, 954 (Idaho 1965) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The essence of the quasi estoppel doctrine is "the existence of facts and circumstances
making the assertion of an inconsistent position unconscionable." Jamison v. Consol. Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102
(Alaska 1978) (emphasis added). Although there are no published New Mexico state court decisions discussing
quasi estoppel, the doctrine is recognized in the Tenth Circuit See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 911 F. Supp.
1351, 1360 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing In re Sampson, 997 F.2d 717, 724-25 n.6 (10th Cir. 1993)), aff'd, 138 F.3d
1304 (10th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 158 F.3d 1060 (10th Cir. 1998). For the author's discussion of another
state's view of quasi estoppel, see Michael D. Moberly & Laura L Farley, Blowing Hot and Cold on the Frozen
Tundra: A Review of Alaska's Quasi-Estoppel Doctrine, 15 ALASKA L REv. 281 (1998).
37. See Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1996) (observing that
"the doctrine of judicial estoppel remains unsettled"); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d
208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The specific requirements [of the doctrine] ... are rather vague and vary from state to
state and from circuit to circuit.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp.,
747 F.2d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (referring to the doctrine's "absence of defined principles"); Otis Elevator
Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 447 P.2d 879, 886 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968) (Molloy, J., specially concurring) ("The exact
ingredients of this doctrine are not formalized and it may very well be that several principles of law have been
miscegenated under the label of 'judicial estoppel."'); Deeks, supra note 11, at 876 (observing that courts "have
defined ... judicial estoppel in a mind-bending number of ways"). But cf AFN, Inc. v. Schlott, Inc., 798 F. Supp.
219, 224 (D.N.J. 1992) ("The contours of the doctrine are, for the most part, relatively straightforward.").
38. Woods, 638 S.W.2d at 406; see also Deeks, supra note 11, at 875 ("Judicial estoppel targets litigants
who 'play fast and loose' with the judicial system in an attempt to attain multiple recoveries from opponents or to
sample different theories until a court finally allows recovery based on one.").
39. The New Mexico Supreme Court has only occasionally made reference to judicial estoppel. See El Paso
Prod. Co. v. PWG Partnership, 116 N.M. 583,587,866 P.2d 311,315 (1993); Romero v. Mervyn's, 109 N.M. 249,
259, 784 P.2d 992, 1002 (1989). Instead, the development of the doctrine has occurred primarily in the court of
appeals. This phenomenon is consistent with the continuing expansion of the court of appeals' appellate
jurisdiction. to the point where two of its judges recently predicted that the New Mexico Supreme Court will soon
become "more nearly a court of last resort, reviewing decisions of the court of appeals by writ of certiorari."
Thomas A. Donnelly & Pamela B. Minzner, History of the New Mexico Court of Appeals, 22 N.M. L REV. 595,
615 (1992).
40. 89 N.M. 360, 552 P.2d 796 (Ct. App. 1976).
41. See id. at 363-64,552 P.2d at 799-800.
42. See id. at 366,552 P.2d at 802. For an example of the application ofjudicial estoppel to preclude a party
from asserting a position inconsistent with one taken in prior preliminary injunction proceedings, see Murray v.
Silberstein, 882 F.2d 61, 65-67 (3d Cir. 1989).
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that the borrowers were not estopped,43 the court described the judicial estoppel
doctrine in the following terms:
The doctrine of "judicial estoppel" is a rule which estops a party from playing
"fast and loose" with the court during the course of litigation. It is not, however,
strictly a question of estoppel. "Judicial estoppel" simply means that a party is
not permitted to maintain inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings. Where
a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding and succeeds in
maintaining that position, he may not thereafter assume a contrary position,
especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the
position formerly taken by him."
New Mexico courts have affirmed this definition of judicial estoppel on several
subsequent occasions, 5 emphasizing both the prejudice element" and the related
requirement that the party against whom the doctrine is being invoked must have
succeeded on its first assertion.4 7 Thus, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has
applied judicial estoppel where a party obtained a favorable trial court ruling on the
4
basis of an assertion that was inconsistent with a position it was taking on appeal. 8
4
(This is a common scenario for invoking the doctrine.) ' However, the court has
indicated that it will not apply the doctrine unless the party asserting inconsistent
positions was successful in asserting its initial position" and the other party was
prejudiced by that assertion.5'

43. The court's holding was premised primarily upon its rejection of the argument that the borrowers had
consented to the receiver's appointment. See Citizens Bank, 89 N.M. at 366-67, 552 P.2d at 802-03.
44. Id. at 366, 552 P.2d at 802 (citations omitted).
45. See, e.g., Sun Country Physical Therapy Assocs., Inc. v. New Mexico Self-Insurers' Fund, 121 N.M.
248, 249, 910 P.2d 324, 325 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Citizens Bank); Johnson v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 117
N.M. 697, 699, 875 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Citizens Bank); Baca v. Velez, 114 N.M. 13, 16, 833
P.2d 1194, 1197 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Citizens Bank).
46. See infra notes 167-88 and accompanying text.
47. See Salazare v. St. Vincent Hosp., 96 N.M. 409,414,631 P.2d 315,320 (Ct. App.) (construing Citizens
Bank), affd in part and rev'd in part,95 N.M. 147, 619 P.2d 823 (1980) (not mentioning the estoppel issue).
[Editor's Note: There is not a typographical error on the volume numbers. The court of appeals decision was dated
July 1, 1980. The supreme court decision was dated November 24, 1980. For some reason, the supreme court case
was published in an earlier volume]. See also Rodriguez v. La Mesilla Constr. Co., 123 N.M. 489, 494, 943 P.2d
136, 141 (Ct. App. 1997) ("Judicial estoppel is a doctrine that prevents a party who has successfully assumed a
certain position in judicial proceedings from then assuming an inconsistent position .... "); Johnson, 117 N.M.
at 700, 875 P.2d at 1131 (noting that judicial estoppel applies where the party "successfully assumes a certain
position in a judicial proceeding... [and] then assume[s] an inconsistent position").
48. See, e.g., Salazare, 96 N.M. at 413-14, 621 P.2d at 319-20.
49. See Arizona v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290,304 (Ariz. 1996).("The doctrine's application... usually involves
a [party] who asserts one position at trial and another on appeal."), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1128 (1997); see also
Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (indicating that under the
judicial estoppel doctrine, there "must be... no reversal between trial and appeal"). See generallySligh v. Watson,
214 P.2d 123, 125 (Ariz. 1950) ("On appeal... the record has been made, the issues stand in bold relief, and surely
there is no sound reason for an appellant vacillating with inconsistent theories when his case reaches [an appellate]
court."), overruledin partby Diamond v. Chiated, 300 P.2d 583 (Ariz. 1956) (not commenting on the inconsistent
theory issue).
50. See Rodriguez, 123 N.M. at 494,943 P.2d at 141; Johnson, 117 N.M. at 700, 875 P.2d at 1131.
51. See Rodriguez, 123 N.M. at 494-95, 943 P.2d at 141-42.
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Application of the Doctrine in New Mexico's FederalCourts
Like the New Mexico state courts,52 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit (which has appellate jurisdiction over federal cases arising in New
Mexico)53 has indicated that judicial estoppel can apply only when a party has
successfully asserted a prior inconsistent position.' Despite the Tenth Circuit's
apparent agreement with the New Mexico state courts' interpretation of the
doctrine, federal courts in New Mexico have been considerably less receptive to
applying the doctrine than the state courts.55 Indeed, while the Tenth Circuit
presumably would apply state law judicial estoppel principles in a diversity case
57
arising in New Mexico,' it has never applied the doctrine in a nondiversity case.
The Tenth Circuit's resistance to judicial estoppel can be traced to its decision
in Parkinsonv. CaliforniaCo. in 1956.58 The plaintiff in Parkinsonwas injured in
59
an explosion when a worker accidentally ignited a gas leak at the plaintiff's cafe.
The plaintiff sued the manufacturer and the distributor of the gas in federal court,
alleging that they were negligent in failing to odorize the gas so that any leak would
be detectable. 6 The plaintiff had previously made essentially the same allegations
B.

52. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
53. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 41 & 1294(1) (1994). See generally Thomas v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp. 492,496 (M.D.
Ala. 1984) (observing that a federal district court is bound to follow the law of the circuit in which it sits).
54. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 716 (10th Cir. 1993)
(observing that judicial estoppel "prevents a party from relying on inconsistent arguments in successive stages of
litigation when the party was victorious on the point in a prior phase of the case"), modified on other grounds on
reh'g en banc, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir.
1986) (stating that "judicial estoppel barfs] a party from presenting an inconsistent assertion in subsequent
litigation only if that party succeeded in the earlier litigation").
55. Federal courts typically have their own judicial estoppel rules. See Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1038
(9th Cir. 1990) ("Each court, state and federal, is entitled to have whatever rules of judicial estoppel it considers
necessary to protect its dignity and it [sic] system of justice."); Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598
n.4 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Judicial estoppel is a rule designed to protect the integrity of judicial institutions. The question
primarily concerns federal interests, and, consequently, federal courts must be free to develop principles that most
adequately serve their institutional interests.").
56. See Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 874 F.2d 1346, 1363-64
(10th Cir. 1989) ("Inasmuch as the application of judicial estoppel in this diversity action goes to the adequacy of
[the plaintiff's] legal remedy, we look to the appropriate state law to determine whether judicial estoppel is
recognized."); see also Reno v. Beckett, 555 F.2d 757, 770 (10th Cir. 1977) (applying Kansas judicial estoppel
principles). Not all circuits agree with this approach. See generally Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp.,
834 F.2d 208, 215 (1st Cir. 1987) ("In diversity cases, courts disagree whether the proper estoppel law is state or
federal."). The Fourth Circuit for example, has stated that "federaJ law controls the application of judicial estoppel
[in diversity cases], since it relates to the integrity of the federal judicial process." Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d
1162, 1167 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982). For a recent academic discussion of this issue, see Deeks, supra note 11.
57. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1520 n.10 (10th Cir. 1991). See
generally In re Osborn, 24 F.3d 1199, 1207 n.1 1 (10th Cir. 1994) ("In a federal question case, we rejected the
doctrine of judicial estoppel. However, where state law substantively controls.... we have applied the law of the
state in question.") (citations omitted).
58. 233 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1956). See, e.g., Deeks, supra note 11, at 880 n.35 ("The case that spurred the
.
Tenth Circuit's rejection of judicial estoppel was Parkinson .
59. See Parkinson, 233 F.2d at 434-35.
60. See id at 434.
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in a parallel state court action,6 t but had also asserted a negligence claim against the
retailer in state court that he did not assert in the federal action.62
The manufacturer and distributor moved to dismiss the federal action, 6 arguing
that the plaintiffs state court assertion that the explosion was caused by the
retailer's negligence" was inconsistent with his assertion that they were responsible
for his injuries.6 5 The trial court apparently agreed" and dismissed the federal
action.67
The Tenth Circuit reversed," rejecting the defendants' judicial estoppel
argument.69 Noting that the doctrine had been recognized by relatively few courts, 0
the Parkinsoncourt rejected the proposition that a party's prior judicial statements
necessarily preclude it from asserting a contrary position.7 The court explained that
a doctrine which "irrevocably freezes the contentions of the pleader so that under
no circumstances may he alter his view... or assert an inconsistent position" would
impede the resolution of cases "on the basis of the true facts as they might be
established ultimately."'7 2
Several courts have characterized this analysis as a categorical rejection of the
judicial estoppel doctrine.73 Indeed, the Tenth Circuit itself has occasionally

61. See id at 435 (referring to the fact that the state court action was filed "prior to the filing of the suit in
the federal court"). For the author's previous consideration of simultaneous state and federal court litigation, see
Michael D. Moberly, Proceeding Geometrically: Rethinking Parallel State and Federal Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 18 WHtrrR L REV. 499 (1997).
62. See Parkinson,233 F.2d at 435. The state court claim against the retailer revolved around its alleged
failure to exercise reasonable care when installing and starting a water heater and stove at the plaintiff's cafe. See
id.
63. See id at 434-35.
64. See id at 436. The plaintiff had dismissed his claims against the manufacturer and distributor relatively
early in the state court litigation. See id. at 435; see also Plumer, supra note 7, at 421 n.82 ("The retailer became
the only defendant in the state court action after the plaintiff's motion to dismiss as against the processor and the
wholesaler was granted.").
65. See Parkinson, 233 F.2d at 437 ("Defendants' view is that [the] petition [before the state court], being
under oath, concluded plaintiff in the new action by operating as an estoppel to question the facts theretofore
asserted which conclusively showed an independent intervening cause of plaintiff's damage.").
66. See id. at 435. The Tenth Circuit stated that the trial court had granted the defendants' motions to
dismiss "generally without specifying reasons." Id. However, the Tenth Circuit also stated that "[tihe trial court
apparently adopted [the] view that the record before it conclusively demonstrated that no negligence of [the
manufacturer or distributor], but rather the negligence of the retailer and its agent as an independent intervening
cause was responsible for the explosion." ld at 434.
67. See id
68. See id. at 440.
69. See id. at 437-38.
70. See id. at 437.
71. See id. at 438. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that prior inconsistent statements may be
"offered as admissions orby way of impeachment," but ae not "conclusive." I at 437-38. Other courts that have
declined to apply judicial estoppel have also concluded that inconsistent statements "still remain available as
evidence, and may be introduced as party admissions at trial." USLIFE Corp. v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 560 F. Supp.
1302, 1305-06 (N.D. Tex. 1983); see also Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 222 F. Supp. 342, 344 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) ("Of course the failure to apply the doctrine would not prevent the introduction in evidence of prior
inconsistent testimony for the purpose of attacking credibility.").
72. Parkinson, 233 F.2d at 438.
73. See, e.g., Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1038 n.3 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Parkinson for
the proposition that "the Tenth Circuit has rejected the doctrine of judicial estoppel"); see also Plumer, supra note
7, at 426 (referring to "other circuits that have ... relied on Parkinson'ssweeping proscription" of judicial
estoppel).
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interpreted its decision in Parkinson in that manner.74 However, Parkinson may
merely reflect the court's refusal to apply the doctrine under the facts at issue in that
particular case.75 The court there had noted, for example, that the positions the
plaintiff had taken in the two actions were not genuinely inconsistent, because the
federal action merely omitted certain matters alleged in the state court action.76
Because it is axiomatic, both in New Mexico and elsewhere, that judicial estoppel
cannot apply unless the two positions at issue are truly inconsistent,' the Tenth
Circuit could have rejected the defendants' judicial estoppel argument on this basis
79
alone.7 8 Its purported rejection of the doctrine would obviously have been dicta.
The Parkinson court emphasized that prior judicial statements "in and of
themselves" do not foreclose a party from asserting contrary positions.' Discussing
with apparent approval the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Hatten Realty
Co. v. Baylies,8 ' the Parkinsoncourt explained that judicial estoppel applies only
when the party against whom it has been invoked was successful in asserting an
earlier position.' Because the state court proceeding at issue in Parkinsonwas still
pending when the judicial estoppel argument was raised 3-- that is, because the

74. See In re BCD Corp., 119 F.3d 852,855 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802
F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1986).
75. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1351, 1359-60 (D. Kan. 1995) (suggesting that the
Tenth Circuit would apply judicial estoppel under other factual circumstances), afftd, 138 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir.),
reh'g en banc granted, 158 F.3d 1060 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Plumer,supra note 7,at 420 n.76 (concluding
that "Parkinson'sholding that judicial estoppel was inappropriate was correct under the facts before the cour")
(emphasis added).
76. See Parkinson, 233 F.2d at 438. The court added that "[e]ven assuming that the [retailer] and its workman were negligent, as asserted in the first [action], and that their negligence contributed to cause plaintiff's damage, these factors would not necessarily insulate [the manufacturer and the distributor] from liability." Id. at 439.
77. See Johnson v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 117 N.M. 697, 700, 875 P.2d 1128, 1132 (Ct. App. 1994)
(declining to apply judicial estoppel where the two positions were not "necessarily inconsistent"); Ranville v. J.T.S.
Enters., Inc., 101 N.M. 803, 805, 689 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Ct. App. 1984) (observing that "inconsistency... is
required for the application of judicial estoppel"); see also Department of Transp. v. Coe,445 N.E.2d 506, 508 (ill.
CL App. 1983) (stating that one of the "requirements for application of the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel" is that "the
two positions must be totally inconsistent-the truth of one must necessarily preclude the truth of the other").
78. See Plumer, supra note 7, at 422 (suggesting that the Tenth Circuit "merely dismiss[ed] the doctrine
in Parkinsonon the grounds that the plaintiff's positions were not contradictory and that the doctrine was therefore
not applicable"); see also Deeks, supra note 11, at 880 n.35 ("The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff's positions
were not inconsistent; one pleading merely omitted certain facts contained in the other.").
79. See Plumer, supra note 7, at 420 n.76.
80. Parkinson,233 F.2d at 438.
81. 290 P. 561 (Wyo. 1930). HattenRealty is a frequently cited judicial estoppel decision in which the court
discussed the "foundation of the doctrine." See Martin v. Wood, 229 P.2d 710, 712 (Ariz. 1951). It involved an
action by a real estate agent to recover a commission due as the result of an exchange of property between the
defendant and a third party. See Hatten Realty, 290 P. at 561-62. The court held that the defendant was judicially
estopped from denying the validity of the commission because it had successfully relied on the commission as an
at 562, 565-68. The court discussed
element of damages in an earlier fraud action against the third party. See id.
the doctrine's application in Tennessee and various other jurisdictions. See id at 566-68. The court then explained
its holding on the following basis:
[W]hile as a general rule a position taken by a man in one proceeding is merely evidence and
cannot work an absolute estoppel in another proceeding in favor of a stranger to the first, yet,
though the Tennessee courts probably go too far, the ...cases tend to show that such evidence
may at times, in cases in which... a man is successful in the position taken in the first
proceeding, rise to the dignity of conclusiveness.
Id. at 568.
82. See Parkinson,233 F.2d at 438.
83. See Plumer, supra note 7,at 420 n.76 (noting that "both cases were still at the pleading stage" when
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plaintiff had not succeeded on his contention that the retailer was liable for his
injuries 8 4-- the holding in Parkinson need not have been premised upon a
categorical rejection of judicial estoppel.8 5 For these reasons, the Tenth Circuit's
general proscription of the doctrine in Parkinsonhas occasionally been characterized as dicta.8 6
The Tenth Circuit's first significant post-Parkinson discussion of judicial
estoppel occurred in United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land.' In that case, the
defendants asserted a position inconsistent with one they had taken when attempting
to intervene in an earlier, related action."8 Because the defendants' argument in the
first action had been rejected, the court held that they were not estopped from
asserting an inconsistent position in the second action. 9 Although the court cited
Parkinsonwithout criticism, it based its holding on the fact that "most courts that
have adopted judicial estoppel bar a party from presenting an inconsistent assertion
in subsequent litigation only if that party succeeded in the earlier litigation.""
This analysis may reflect a retreat from Parkinson,9' since the court's discussion
of the prior success requirement in 49.01 Acres of Land suggests that it might apply
the doctrine against a party who had succeeded on the basis of a previous
inconsistent assertion. 2 This interpretation is bolstered by the Tenth Circuit's more
recent decision in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers InternationalAss'n, Local No. 9.93
The Guidry court cited 49.01 Acres of Land while proclaiming that the doctrine's
present status in the Tenth Circuit is unsettled,9 suggesting that it may be prepared
to reconsider its resistance to judicial estoppel.9 5 As one commentator has stated:

the argument was made).
84. See Parkinson,233 F.2d at 439 (' he state complaint, itself, did not show as a matter of law that there
was any... independent intervening cause for plaintiff's damage .... ").
85. See Plumer,supra note 7, at 420 n.76 (concluding that Parkinsonwas decided correctly because judicial
estoppel should not apply "unless a litigant has benefited from a position taken in another proceeding").
86. See id Them appears to be support for this interpretation of Parkinson in the Tenth Circuit as well. See,
e.g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 716 (10th Cir. 1993) (declining to
"decid[e] whether the doctrine applies in the Tenth Circuit"), modified on othergrounds on reh'g en banc, 39 F.3d
1078 (10th Cir. 1994); Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 874 F.2d 1346,
1363-64 (10th Cir. 1989) (referring to the Tenth Circuit's "perceived" rejection of judicial estoppel).
87. 802 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1986).
88. See id. at 390.
89. See id.

90. Id. (citing, inter alia, Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982)).
91. See Plumer, supra note 7, at 426 (observing that the Tenth Circuit's decision in 49.01 Acres of Land
"represents a great step toward limiting Parkinson to its facts"). But c. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler,
Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1520 n.10 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing 49.01 Acres of Land for the proposition that the Tenth
Circuit "does not recognize the doctrine of judicial estoppel").
92. See, e.g., In re BCD Corp., 119 F.3d 852,855 (10th Cir. 1997) (observing that "judicial estoppel would
only apply if the party adopting the inconsistent positions had actually succeeded in the earlier litigation"); Pearson
v. Federal Express Corp., No. CIV.A.90-A-279, 1991 WL 180104, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 9, 1991) ("The Tenth
Circuit has rejected the doctrine of judicial estoppel if the party presenting an inconsistent position was
unsuccessful in the priorproceeding.")(emphasis added).
93. 10 F.3d 700 (10th Cit. 1993), ndified on othergrounds on reh'g en banc,39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir.

1994).
94. See id at 716. In an en banc review of the Circuit panel's decision in Guidry, the Tenth Circuit declined
to disturb the panel's analysis of the judicial estoppel doctrine. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n,
Local No. 9, 39 P.3d 1078, 1081 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1063 (1995).
95. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1351, 1360 (D. Kan. 1995) (observing that the Guidry
court "hinted... that it might be willing to revisit its stance on judicial estoppel"), afrd, 138 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir.),
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The 49.01 Acres of Land opinion demonstrates the Tenth Circuit's unwillingness to condemn judicial estoppel in all circumstances. Such restraint represents
a great step toward limiting Parkinsonto its facts. The court's recognition that
judicial estoppel may be a useful remedy in certain limited situations implies

that when confronted with the proper factual situation-one in which the party
to be estopped benefited from his earlier position-the Tenth Circuit may yet
adopt the rule.'

A repudiation of Parkinson might be welcomed by trial courts in the Tenth
Circuit,97 which have been less hostile to the judicial estoppel doctrine than the
Tenth Circuit itself." The New Mexico federal district courts, for example, have
acknowledged that the Tenth Circuit has never recognized the doctrine," but have
occasionally suggested that the courts nevertheless have the equitable discretion to
apply judicial estoppel under certain circumstances."° Indeed, a New Mexico
district court actually applied the doctrine in NCR Corp. v. Hopper Specialty Co.
in 1994.201
The principal issue in NCR Corp. was whether the parties were bound by an
agreement to arbitrate."° The respondent argued that it was not a party to the
agreement containing the pertinent arbitration provision. 3 The petitioner, on the
other hand, maintained that the respondent was estopped from denying that it was
bound to arbitrate because it had asserted in a related state court action that it was
a party to the agreement containing the arbitration provision."
The court began by acknowledging the Tenth Circuit's apparent opposition to
judicial estoppel."0 5 It nevertheless concluded that its failure to apply the doctrine
would lead to an inequitable result,"° because a party "should not be permitted to
claim that an enforceable contract exists in one instance and, then, when trying to

reh'g en banc granted, 158 F.3d 1060 (10th Cir. 1998).
96. Plumer, supra note 7,at 426.
97. Judicial estoppel "is widely viewed as a tool to be used by the courts in impeding those litigants who
would otherwise play 'fast and loose' with the legal system." Paschke v. Retool Indus., 519 N.W.2d 441, 444
(Mich. 1994); see also Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 266 S.W.313, 317 (Tenn. 1924) (describing judicial
estoppel as a "very valuable restraint on reckless or pejured litigants"); Plumer, supra note 7,at 412 (referring to
"the doctrine's potential usefulness").
98. See, e.g., Smith, 911 F. Supp. at 1359 ("We are not convinced... that the Tenth Circuit would find
[judicial] estoppel to be inapplicable on the facts of this case."). The Tenth Circuit itself recently acknowledged
that "various district courts in this circuit have applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel." Rascon v. U.S. West
Communications, 143 F.3d 1324, 1330 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998).
99. See EEOC v. MTS Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1503, 1511 (D.N.M. 1996); Santa Fe Village Venture v. City
of Albuquerque, 914 F. Supp. 478,482 (D.N.M. 1995).
100. See MTS Corp., 937 F. Supp. at 1511.
101. No. CIV 93-0791 LH/DJS, 1994 WL 510999 (D.N.M. Jan. 28, 1994).
102. See id.at l.
103. See id. In particular, the respondent argued that "the employee who signed the agreement ...did not
have the authority to execute the agreement on behalf of [the respondent], that (the petitioner] knew that [she] did
not have such authority, and that [the respondent's] president was at all times unaware of the written contract's
existence." Id.
104. See id.at*3.
105. See id (citing Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432,438 (10th Cir. 1956)).
106. See id. See generally Young v. United States Dep't of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1989)
(observing that judicial estoppel "is supposed to protect judicial integrity by... avoiding unfair results").
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' 7
avoid the contract's arbitration clause, claim that the contract never existed."' 0
Accordingly,108 the court rejected the respondent's contention that it had not agreed

to arbitrate.

Given the Tenth Circuit's resistance to judicial estoppel," 9 NCR Corp. represents
a surprisingly broad application of the doctrine, because the party against whom it
was invoked in that case had not succeeded on, or otherwise benefited from, its
initial assertion. ° This case suggests that the courts in the Tenth Circuit are willing
to consider judicial estoppel. Moreover, it may mean that the Tenth Circuit's
ultimate view of judicial estoppel (assuming it does, indeed, "revisit its stance" on
the doctrine). 1 may be that, like the New Mexico state courts,' 12 the doctrine is only
applied when the party to be estopped has benefited from its initial position."' Until
the Tenth Circuit revisits its stance, however, New Mexico practitioners should be
aware of the divergent views of state and federal courts. These divergent views
should raise tactical red flags.
II. COMPETING VIEWS OF THE "PRIOR SUCCESS" REQUIREMENT
A.

The Majority View
4
In concluding that prior success is a prerequisite to the doctrine's application,' "
the New Mexico courts have aligned themselves with the majority of other
jurisdictions that recognize judicial estoppel.' Although courts are divided on this

107. NCR Corp., 1994 WL510999, at *3.
108. See id. at *3-4.
109. See supra notes 56-96 and accompanying text.
110. The state court action in which the party had taken an inconsistent position was still pending at the time
of the district court's decision. See NCR Corp., 1994 WL 510999, at *5 (staying the state court action pending
arbitration).
111. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1351, 1360 (D. Kan. 1995), aff'd, 138 F.3d 1304 (10th
Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 158 F.3d 1060 (10th Cir. 1998). To date, there is a difference of opinion between the
district courts in the circuit and the Tenth Circuit. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. The Tenth Circuit
recently stated that it was adhering to its previous "refusal to adopt the doctrine of judicial estoppel." See Rascon
v. U.S. West Communications, 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Webb v. ABF Freight Sys., 155
F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The Tenth Circuit has firmly established that it will not be bound by the
doctrine of judicial estoppel.").
112. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
113. See Webb, 155 F.3d at 1242 n.16 (observing that "one of the elements of [the] doctrine is that the party
against whom estoppel is asserted must have prevailed on the basis of his contradictory position in the prior
proceeding"); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700,716 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting
that, as recognized by other circuits, judicial estoppel, "prevents a party from relying on inconsistent arguments
... when the party was victorious.., in [the] prior phase of the case"), modified on other grounds on reh'g en
banc, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994); Deeks, supra note 11, at 880 n.33 (stating that the Tenth Circuit has "hinted
that if [it were] to use the doctrine, [it] would apply the... [prior] success test"); Plumer, supra note 7, at 426
(concluding that the Tenth Circuit may apply judicial estoppel "when... the party to be estopped benefited from
his earlier position"); cf Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("In all
precedent cited to us and which we have researched independently, the party against whom [judicial] estoppel is
invoked received some benefit from the previously taken position.").
114. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
115. See Arizona v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 305 (Ariz. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1128 (1997). See also
supra note 28.
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issue, 1 6 most have concluded that a litigant's assertion of inconsistent positions,
standing alone, is insufficient to warrant the doctrine's application. " 7 These courts
hold that a party who is unsuccessful in asserting a particular position ordinarily can
take a subsequent position that is inconsistent with its original assertion."'
Under this view of judicial estoppel," 9 only when a party's prior inconsistent
position has been successfully asserted-where the party "received a benefit in the
first trial" 2°--is there the threat to the integrity of the judicial process that the
doctrine is designed to avoid.' The Tenth Circuit has stated this point in the
following terms:
Judicial estoppel bars a party from adopting inconsistent positions in the same
or related litigation. Courts adopting this doctrine have reasoned that it is
necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial process.
[M]ost courts that have adopted judicial estoppel bar a party from
...
presenting an inconsistent assertion only if that party succeeded in the earlier
litigation. They conclude that the integrity of the court is not threatened if the
court failed to adopt the party's prior position."n
The denomination of the prior success rule as the majority view has been
questioned." 3 Yet, the application of the judicial estoppel doctrine appears to be
particularly appropriate where the party asserting inconsistent positions obtained
judicial relief (or otherwise gained an advantage) as the result of its initial

116. See AFN, Inc. v. Schlott, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 219, 224-25 (D.N.J. 1992) (referring to the prior success
requirement as "an uncertain aspect of the doctrine"); USIJFE Corp. v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 560 F. Supp. 1302, 1305
(N.D. Tex. 1983) (referring to "the variation accorded to whether or not judicial estoppel can only be applied when
the prior position was successfully maintained").
117. See Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 438 (10th Cir. 1956) (stating that "prior statements, in
and of themselves, [ordinarily will not] foreclose a party from asserting a contrary position"); State Farm Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Civil Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 509 P.2d 725, 731 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) ("Mhe essence of the doctrine of
judicial estoppel is not merely that a party has taken inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings.").
118. See United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the judicial
estoppel doctrine did not prevent litigants from making inconsistent arguments because "their [initial] argument
...was rejected"); Hrudka v. Hrudka, 919 P.2d 179, 187 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (observing that "a party that is
unsuccessful with the first position asserted thereafter may take an alternative position in a latter proceeding").
119. Not surprisingly, this view is often referred to as the "prior success" rule. See Boyers, supra note 16,
at 1255-56.
120. Mecham v City of Glendale, 489 P.2d 65,67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971); cf.Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco,
Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (equating the receipt of a litigation benefit with "judicial success");
Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (concluding that a party benefited
from its previous inconsistent position if it "won" as the result of having asserted the position).
121. See Arizona v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 305 (Ariz. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1128 (1997); cf
Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NILRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Although [the 'prior success' requirement]
allows parties to contradict themselves in court, it threatens only the integrity of the parties, not of the court.").
122. United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 802 F.2d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); cf AFN,
Inc. v. Schlott, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 219, 225 (D.NJ. 1992) ("[A]bsent acceptance of [the] prior position, there is no
risk of inconsistent results and, thus, the integrity of the judicial process is unaffected and the perception and/or
danger that either the first or subsequent court was misled is not present.").
123. See Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to the
"so-called" majority view); AFN, Inc., 798 F. Supp. at 225 n.7 ("question[ing] the use of the word 'majority"' to
describe the view requiring prior judicial adoption of the inconsistent position); see also Prilliman v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 154 (Ct. App. 1997) (discussing Rissetto and AFN, Inc.); but cf. Deeks, supra
note 11, at 877 (stating that the prior success rule is "referred to as the 'majority' position" because it is "the most
common version of the doctrine").
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assertion."2 In essence, the fast and loose conduct that judicial estoppel is meant to
preclude" 5 (and on which the minority view of the doctrine specifically focuses) 6
is most clearly exemplified by a party who recovers from an adversary by asserting
one position and later attempts to establish against the same adversary a claim
inconsistent with its earlier assertion.' Thus, the focus of the doctrine may be on
the danger of inconsistent judicial decisions, rather than on one party's mere
assertion of inconsistent positions."
B.

The Minority View
Under the minority view of judicial estoppel, the doctrine can be invoked even
when a party was previously unsuccessful in asserting a contrary position if the
party is found to be engaging in fast and loose behavior." 9 This approach, which
focuses largely on the doctrine's original purpose" 0 of protecting the "sanctity of
the oath,"'' a is premised upon the proposition that the integrity of the judicial
process can be compromised by conduct short of inconsistent results.' 32
Perhaps the most extensive and well-reasoned argument in favor of the minority
view comes from the AFN, Inc. v. Schlott, Inc. court.'33 That court described the

124. See Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 601 n.3 (observing that "most of the cases can be read as saying that judicial
estoppel is paricularlyappropriate when the party succeeded in the prior proceeding"); Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co.,
667 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Though perhaps not necessarily confined to situations where the party
asserting the earlier contrary position there prevailed, it is obviously more appropriate in that situation.").
125. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
126. See Towery, 920 P.2d at 305 n.13.
127. See Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1984).
128. See Paschke v. Retool Indus., 519 N.W.2d 441, 444 n.4 (Mich. 1994); see also Astor Chauffeured
Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Co., 910 F.2d 1540,1548 (7th Cir. 1990) ('Teoffense is not taking inconsistent
positions so much as it is winning, twice, on the basis of incompatible positions."); Decks, supra note 11, at 877
("[C]ourts [that follow the majority view] are concerned less with the appearance of inconsistency that might arise
when parties flip positions than with the actual inconsistency that would arise if the litigant convinced two different
courts of two contrary statements.").
129. See Stevens Technical Seys., Inc. v. Steamship Brooklyn, 885 F.2d 584,589 (9th Cir. 1989); Towery,
920 P.2d 290, 305 n.13; see also Decks, supranote 11, at 874 n.4 ("The 'fast and loose' test... does not require
that a litigant have succeeded in her earlier position.").
130. See Boyers, supra note 16, at 1251 ("As originally conceived ... , the doctrine of judicial estoppel was
based solely on the sanctity of the oath.") (footnote omitted); Henkin, supra note 10, at 1726 ("'The oldest
justification for the doctrine was.., the necessity to protect the sanctity of the oath.").
131. Bates v. Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028, 1038 (2d Ci. 1993); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911
F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39, 48 (1857)). The
importance of this objective was noted by the Wyoming Supreme Court:
This doctrine is said to have its foundation in the obligation under which every man is placed
to speak and act according to the truth of the case, and in the policy of the law to suppress the
mischiefs from the destruction of all confidence in the intercourse and dealings of men, if they
were allowed to deny that which by their solemn and deliberate acts they have declared to be
true. And this doctrine applies with peculiar force to admissions or statements made under the
sanction of an oath, in the course of judicial proceedings. The chief security and safeguard for
the purity and efficiency of the administration ofjustice is to be found in the proper reverence
for the sanctity of an oath.
Hatten Realty Co. v. Baylies, 290 P. 561, 566 (Wyo. 1930) (quoting Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed)
39,48 (1857)).
132. See AFN, Inc. v. Schlott, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 219,225 (D.N.J. 1992); cf. Boyers, supra note 16, at 1249
(observing that "any inconsistent statement.. . injures the integrity of the judicial process"). But cf. Towery, 920
P.2d 290, 305 (observing that "the judicial process is unimpaired absent inconsistent results").
133. 798 F. Supp. 219 (D.NJ. 1992).
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issue of whether prior judicial success is a prerequisite to the application of judicial
estoppel as an uncertain one," and took issue with the characterization of the prior
success rule as the majority view.'35 In particular, the court noted that many of the
cases often cited as embracing a prior success requirement do not actually stand for
that proposition, although some do support the view that the application of judicial
estoppel is most appropriate when the party pursuing inconsistent positions was
successful in asserting its initial position. 36
After comparing the two competing views, 37 the AFN, Inc. court ultimately
concluded that prior judicial success should not be a prerequisite to the doctrine's
application. 3 The court concluded that the propriety of applying judicial estoppel
must be decided on a case-by-case basis, 139 with the issue of whether the initial
position was successfully maintained simply being one factor for the court to
consider."' Indeed, the court apparently was of the view that prior success should
be a relatively insignificant factor in its analysis,""' having stated that "whether a
court is asked to rely or has in fact relied on a prior inconsistent position should be
a distinction without a difference."' 42
C.

Intimations of the Minority View in New Mexico
Despite the apparent approval of the prior success requirement in Citizens Bank
v. C & H Construction& Paving Co.,143 United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land,'" and
other New Mexico and Tenth Circuit cases, 45 implicit support for the minority view
of judicial estoppel can be found in cases such as Apodaca v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railroad" and Franksv. Nimmo. t47 Apodaca, Franksand other similar
cases 48 effectively hold that an affidavit contradicting the affiant's own prior
deposition testimony can be disregarded in considering a motion for summary

134. See id. at 224-25.

135. See id at 225 n.7.
136. See id. at 225 n.7, 226; see also Murray v. Silberstein, 882 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[A] case is
particularly appropriate for applying an estoppel [where the party] benefited from his original position.").
137. See AFN, Inc., 798 F. Supp. at 224-25. One commentator, noting the refusal of some courts to recognize
the doctrine in any form, has stated that "courts generally adopt one of three broad stances toward the doctrine."
Deeks, supra note 11, at 876 (emphasis added).
138. See AFN, Inc., 798 F. Supp. at 227.
139. See id. at 226; cf. McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that
judicial estoppel cases "must be decided upon [their] own particular facts and circumstances"); Jackson Jordan,
Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that the application of judicial estoppel
involves "basically an 'ad hoc' decision in each case").
140. See AFN, Inc., 798 F. Supp. at 226.

141. See id.at 227 n.12 ("A party's cavalier switch of position from one case to the next or from one
proceeding to the next is inimical to the integrity of the judicial system, regardless of whether the court
affirmatively relies on the representation.").
142. Id. at 225.
143. 89 N.M. 360,552 P.2d 796 (Ct. App. 1976).
144. 802 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1986).
145. See supra notes 44-51, 87-96 & 111-13 and accompanying text.
146. 67 N.M. 227, 354 P.2d 524 (1960).
147. 796 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1986).
148. See, e.g., Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1532 (D.Kan. 1990) (stating that "a party
opposing a motion for summary judgment may not attempt to create a sham fact issue to defeat the motion through
the submission of affidavits which conflict with earlier sworn statements").
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judgment. The rationale for this holding is that "the utility of summary judgment
as a procedure for screening out sham fact issues would be greatly undermined if
a party could create an issue of fact merely by submitting an affidavit contradicting
his own prior testimony."'" Significantly, the view expressed in these cases' 5' has
been described as a contemporary application of the principle that parties may be
judicially estopped from taking inconsistent positions even when their initial
assertions were not judicially accepted. 152
IV. OTHER FREQUENTLY LITIGATED JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL ISSUES
A.

The Privity Requirement
The New Mexico Court of Appeals has held that judicial estoppel cannot be
invoked against one who was not a party to the proceeding in which the previous
inconsistent position was taken.'53 This is also the view held by virtually every other
court to consider the issue." Indeed, it is difficult to see how the rule could be
otherwise, since one purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a party's "cavalier switch
of position from one case to the next or from one proceeding to the next." 55
However, the Tenth Circuit has extended the doctrine's privity requirement 56 a
step further stating that "a person not a party to the previous litigation may not in

149. In Apodaca, for example, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that affidavits the plaintiffs had
submitted in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment "were well calculated to circumvent the
motion for summary judgment, but they fail to achieve this purpose, if for no other reason than that there is no
explanation appearing therein as to the reason for the great discrepancy between them and the plaintiffs' sworn
testimony on deposition." Apodaca, 67 N.M. at 230, 354 P.2d at 526.
150. Franks,796 F.2d at 1237. But cf Griego v. Grieco, 90 N.M. 174, 179,561 P.2d 36,41 (Ct. App. 1977)
("[W]here a conflict arises in statements made by a witness in an affidavit and deposition on a material fact,
summary judgment is improper.").
151. The view is widely held. See Galvin v. Catholic Bishop, 863 F. Supp. 770, 775 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("It is
well established that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment can not defeat that motion by creating
factual issues through affidavits which contradict prior sworn statements."). For a recent general discussion of this
issue, see Jeffrey L Freeman, Annotation, Propriety, Under Rule 56 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,of
GrantingSummary Judgment When Deponent Contradictsin Affidavit EarlierAdmission of Fact, 131 A.LR. FED.
403 (1996).
152. See AFN, Inc. v. Schlott, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 219, 225-26 & n.10 (D.N.J. 1992); see also Stutz Motor
Car of Am., Inc. v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 909 F. Supp. 1353, 1361 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (analogizing Radobenko v.
Automated Equip. Corp., 520 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1975), a case similar to Apodaca, with the judicial estoppel
doctrine).
153. See Citizens Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving Co., 89 N.M. 360, 366, 552 P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App.
1976).
154. See, e.g., Department of Transp. v. Coe, 445 N.E.2d 506,508 (111. App. Ct. 1983) (stating that in order
for judicial estoppel to apply, "the two positions must be taken by the same party").
155. AFN, Inc., 798 F. Supp. at 227 n.12 (emphasis added). It is often said that judicial estoppel protects the
interests of the forum in which an inconsistent position has been asserted. See Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911
F.2d 1214, 1220 (6th Cir. 1990). It, however, is the conduct of a particular litigant asserting inconsistent positions
that triggers the doctrine's application. See, e.g., Tenneco Chems., Inc. v. William T. Burnett & Co., 691 F.2d 658,
665 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating that "the determinative factor [in applying judicial estoppel] is whether [a party]
intentionally misled the court to gain unfair advantage").
156. In this context, "privity" or "mutuality" refers to the traditional requirement that, in order for forms of
estoppel to apply, the prior action must have been between "the same parties or their privies." See Wetzel v.
Arizona State Real Estate Dep't, 727 P.2d 825, 828 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). The other option is that the parties to
the present proceeding otherwise must be bound by the result in the prior action. See Goolsby v. Derby, 189
N.W.2d 909, 913 (Iowa 1971).
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a subsequent suit estop a person who was a party to the previous litigation as to any
inconsistent position taken therein.""' Thus, in the Tenth Circuit's view, both
have been parties to the initial
parties to the second proceeding apparently must also
1 58
proceeding in order for judicial estoppel to apply.
However, a number of courts have concluded that while the doctrine cannot be
invoked againsta stranger to the first proceeding,' 59 it can be assertedby one who
was not a party to that action."6 In fact, because judicial estoppel is designed to
protect the courts, 61 rather than individual litigants, 6 2 several cases hold that a
court can invoke the doctrine sua sponte.163 Under this interpretation, the doctrine's
only privity requirement is that the two inconsistent positions must have been
asserted by the same party."' This appears to be the preferable approach,t 65 and the
one most likely to be adopted in New Mexico.' 66

157. Reno v. Beckett, 555 F.2d 757, 770 (10th Cir. 1977) (applying Kansas law); cf. Nichols v. Scott, 69
F.3d 1255, 1272 n.33 (5th Cir. 1995) ("'here is considerable authority that judicial estoppel does not apply in favor
of one who was not a party to the prior proceeding in which the inconsistent position was taken."); Jackson Jordan,
Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (suggesting an absence of authority supporting
the application of judicial estoppel "in favor of a total stranger to the first phase of the dispute").
158. See In re Johnson, 518 F.2d 246, 252 (10th Cir. 1975) (stating that judicial estoppel "ordinarily applies
to inconsistent positions assumed in the course of the same judicial proceeding or in subsequent proceedings
involving identical parties").
159. See In re Burford, 935 P.2d 943, 948 (Colo. 1997) (observing that "for the doctrine to apply... the two
positions must be taken by the same party or parties in privity with each other").
160. See, e.g., USLIFE Corp. v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 560 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Tex. 1983) ("Because the
doctrine focuses on the relationship between the party to be estopped and the judicial system, courts generally find
that it may be invoked by a person who was not party to the first suit."); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 222
F. Supp. 342, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (observing that the doctrine "may be invoked by a person not a party to the first
suit against one who was a party in that suit"); Long v. Knox, 291 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1956) ("[I]t is not
necessary that the party invoking this doctrine should have been a party to the former proceeding.").
161. See generally Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that "the interests of the second court are uniquely implicated and threatened by the taking of an
incompatible position").
162. See Arizona v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290,304 (Ariz. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1128 (1997).
163. See In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 812 (1990); Hindman v.
Greenville Hosp. Sys., 947 F. Supp. 215, 221 (D.S.C. 1996); Czajkowski v. City of Chicago, 810 F. Supp. 1428,
1434 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
164. See Gottesman, 222 F. Supp. at 344; Department of Transp. v. Coe, 445 N.E.2d 506,508 (I1. App. Ct.
1983). See generally Lillo v. Thee, 676 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) ('he doctrine of judicial estoppel.
. holds that a person who states facts under oath, during the course of a trial, is estopped to deny such facts in a
second suit, even though the parties in the second suit may not be the same as those in the first.").
165. See, e.g., Boyers, supranote 16, at 1250:
No ... crucial nexus between privity and policy exists under judicial estoppel, whose essential
purpose is to prevent parties from deliberately shifting positions to suit the exigencies of the
moment in order to maintain the sanctity of the oath and the integrity of the judicial process.
Indeed, the doctrine has nothing to do with other parties to the suit. Rather, it is the very
inconsistency that judicial estoppel will not tolerate.
(footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).
166. The New Mexico appellate courts have previously held that other forms of estoppel can be invoked by
strangers to the first proceeding.
[The New Mexico Supreme Court has] eliminated the traditional rule that the parties must be
the same or in privity if the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to apply.... Collateral estoppel
may now be used to preclude relitigation of an issue if the party against whom it is to be applied
was a party or in privity with a party in the earlier suit and had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate this issue in that earlier action. The party seeking application of the doctrine does not
have to have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the previous action.
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B.

The Prejudice Requirement
In Ranville v. J.T.S. Enterprises, Inc., 67 the New Mexico Court of Appeals
characterized prejudice to the party invoking judicial estoppel as a prerequisite to
the doctrine's application.' Ranville is not unique; there are several other New
Mexico cases suggesting that prejudice is critical to the application of judicial
estoppel,169 or at least that application of the doctrine is uniquely appropriate where
the potential for prejudice exists. 7 '
In Rodriguez v. La Mesilla Construction Co.,' for example, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals recently declined to apply judicial estoppel because there was no
evidence that the party invoking the doctrine was prejudiced by the other party's
purported change of position. 72 Although the court's refusal to apply judicial
estoppel on this basis'" was an alternative holding, 7 4 that fact presumably does not
undermine the authoritativeness of its analysis of the doctrine's prejudice
requirement. 7 5
However, other courts are divided on this issue. 176 In fact, many jurisdictions that
recognize judicial estoppel apply the doctrine without requiring prejudice to the
party invoking it."7 The rationale for this view was articulated in a frequently cited

Reeves v. Wimberly, 107 N.M. 231, 234, 755 P.2d 75, 78 (Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted) (discussing Silva
v. State, 106 N.M. 472,745 P.2d 380 (1987)).
167. 101 N.M. 803,689 P.2d 1274 (Ct. App. 1984).
168. See id.at 805, 689 P.2d at 1276 ("[llnconsistency and resulting prejudice is required for the application
of judicial estoppel!) (citing Citizens Bank v. C & H Constr. & Paving Co., 89 N.M. 360, 552 P.2d 796 (Ct. App.
197.6)).
169. See, e.g., Salazare v. St. Vincent Hosp., 96 N.M. 409,414,631 P.2d 315,320 (CL App.) (citing Citizens
Bank for the proposition that "where [a] party assumes [a] certain position and succeeds in maintaining that
position, an opponent acquiescing in [the] position may not be prejudiced by [the] party's assumption of [a]
contrary position"), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 95 N.M. 147, 619 P.2d 823 (1980).
170. See, e.g., Johnson v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 117 N.M. 697, 700, 875 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Ct. App.
1994) (observing that the application ofjudicial estoppel is "especially" appropriate if the assertion of inconsistent
positions "prejudices a party who had acquiesced in the [initial] position").
171. 123 N.M. 489,943 P.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1997).
172. See i. at 494-95, 943 P.2d at 141-42.
173. The court indicated that the party invoking the doctrine was required to "demonstrate[] that it was
prejudiced." I. at 495, 943 P.2d at 142. Other courts have similarly concluded that the party invoking judicial
estoppel has the burden of proving that the doctrine should apply. See Patterson v. Kanna, 867 P.2d 518, 519 (Or.
Ct. App. 1994); DeWoody v. Ripley, 951 S.W.2d 935,944 (Tex. App. 1997).
174. See Rodriguez, 123 N.M. at 494,943 P.2d at 141. The court also held that the case did not involve "the
kind of inconsistency... that would mandate that judicial estoppel be invoked." Id.; cf Ranville v. J.T.S. Enters.,
Inc., 101 N.M. 803, 805,689 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Ct App. 1984) (observing that "inconsistency... is required for
the application ofjudicial estoppel").
175. See, e.g., Paterson v. Brafman, 530 So. 2d 499, 501 n.4 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1988) ("The fact that [a
ruling] was an alternative holding of the court does not detract from its binding authority."); cf. National
Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 F.2d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 1986) (observing that a judicial opinion with alternative
holdings, while perhaps "dilute[d]," nevertheless "provides guidance to the community, and reduces legal
uncertainty").
176. See Medicare Rentals, Inc. v. Advanced Servs., 460 S.E.2d 361,363 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) ("Courts are
divided as to whether the party asserting the doctrine must have relied on the opposing party's previous assertion
or suffer some other prejudice.'); Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(referring to "the variation of the doctrine involving prejudice to a party").
177. See, e.g., Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208,214 (1stCir. 1987) ('[H]arn
to an opponent is not an invariable prerequisite to judicial estoppel."); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397
F. Supp. 1146, 1178 (D.S.C. 1975) ("hepreclusion rule has been held to operate... irrespective of reliance by,
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Tennessee case, 7 ' Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 79 where the court stated:
The... law of judicial estoppel (properly so called) has nothing to do with other
parties to the suit; nor does it matter whether they even knew of the sworn
statement. It is... based solely upon that public policy which upholds the
sanctity of an oath, and precludes a party who has made a sworn statement-even in another litigation-from repudiating the same when he thinks it
is to his advantage to do so. 1
Despite this observation,'
the analysis in cases such as Ranville and
8 2 is understandable, primarily because
Rodriguez"
a prejudice requirement may be
inherent in the prior success rule.'83 In Jackson Jordan,Inc. v. PlasserAmerican
Corp., for example, the court concluded that prejudice is a prerequisite to the
application of judicial estoppel"8 5 because, in all the cases it had reviewed, the party
against whom the doctrine had been invoked had benefited from its initial
position."8 6 That is, it won as the result of its initial assertion and then sought to win
again on the basis of a contray assertion. Given this analysis, it is hardly surprising
that a jurisdiction like New Mexico, which holds that prior success is a prerequisite
to the application of judicial estoppel,'" would conclude that prejudice to the party
invoking the doctrine is also an important consideration in, if not a prerequisite to,
the doctrine's application.'
V. THE IMPACT OF LIBERAL MODERN PLEADING RULES ON THE
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
The Tenth Circuit's traditional hostility to judicial estoppel" 9 stems primarily
from the doctrine's potential conflict with one of the Federal Rules of Civil

or prejudice to, the party invoking it.") (quoting IB JAMES WM. MOORE Er AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACnCE
10.405[8], at 768 (2d ed. 1971)).
178. See generally Vendig v. Traylor, 604 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tex. App. 1980) (stating that because the
judicial estoppel doctrine was first recognized in Tennessee, "the decisions of that state should be examined in
.applying the doctrine").
179. 266 S.W. 313 (Tenn. 1924).
180. Id. at317.
181. The view that judicial estoppel does not operate for the benefit of litigants is widely held. See, e.g.,
Arizona v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 304 (Ariz. 1996) ("Judicial estoppel is not intended to protect individual litigants
.....
"),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1128 (1997); Boyers, supra note 16, at 1250 ("[T]he doctrine has nothing to do with
the other parties to the suit.").
182. See supra notes 167-75 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Civil Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 509 P.2d 725,731 (Ariz. CL App.
1973) (equating prior success with having "gained an advantage" over the opposing party).
184. 747 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
185. See id at1580.
186. See id. at 1579.
187. See supranotes 44-51 and accompanying text.
188. Indeed, the New Mexico Court of Appeals noted the importance of prejudice to the party invoking
judicial estoppel in Citizens Bank v. C & H Constr.Co., 89 N.M. 360, 366, 552 P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App. 1976),
the case in which it first articulated the prior success requirement. Cf.Henkin, supra note 10, at 1719 ("Texas, for
example, requires both prior success... and prejudice ....(citing Herd Corp. v. Triple 'T'Invs., Inc., No. B1486-506-CV, 1987 WL 17357, at *8 n.2 (Tex. App. Sept. 24, 1987))).
189. See supranotes 56-96 and accompanying text.
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Procedure'90 and, inferentially, that rule's New Mexico state law counterpart. 19' The
potential conflict exists because the judicial estoppel doctrine prevents parties from
maintaining inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings," 9 while Rule 8(e)(2) and
its counterparts 9 3 specifically authorize the pleading of alternative claims or
defenses "regardless of consistency."'" This issue has prompted a number of courts
(including, at least for a time, the Tenth Circuit) 95 to reject the judicial estoppel
doctrine.'96

The New Mexico appellate courts have not directly addressed this issue, but their
familiarity with it is implicit in cases such as Platco Corp. v. Shaw 97 and Buhler v.

Marrujo.98 In Platco, the New Mexico Supreme Court permitted the plaintiff to
amend his complaint to add a count that was inconsistent with his original
allegations,' 99 relying on the fact that Rule 8(e)(2)2 ' "permits a party to state as
many claims as he has regardless of consistency."'2' In Buhler, the New Mexico

190. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2).
191. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-008(E)(2). The New Mexico rule is essentially identical to the federal rule. See
generally Harbin v. Assurance Co. of Am., 308 F.2d 748,750 (10th Cir. 1962) ("The Rules of Civil Procedure for
the District Courts of New Mexico are derived from the Federal Rules and in all respects pertinent hereto are
identical with the Federal Rules."). Although denominated slightly differently, both rules are typically referred to
as "Rule 8(e)(2)." See, e.g., Buhler v. Marrujo, 86 N.M. 399, 401-02, 524 P.2d 1015, 1017-18 (Ct. App. 1974),
overruled on other grounds by Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690,652 P.2d 240 (1982) (overruling
without comment on the Rule 8(e)(2) issue). For the sake of simplicity, this article likewise uses that designation
for both rules (often interchangeably) unless the context requires otherwise.
192. See Citizens Bank, 89 N.M. at 366, 522 P.2d at 802.
193. The federal rule has counterparts in many states besides New Mexico. See, e.g., McCormick v.
Kopmann, 161 N.E.2d 720,727 (I. CL App. 1959) (discussing an llinois rule "modelled [sic] after Rule 8(e)(2)
of the Federal Rules"); Giron v. Housing Auth., 393 So.2d 1267, 1271 (La. 1981) (analyzing a Louisiana rule
patterned after the federal rule); Shapiro v. Solomon, 126 A.2d 654,657 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (quoting
a New Jersey rule "[m]odeled upon Federal Civil Rule 8(e)"); Glover v. Giraldo, 824 P.2d 552, 556 (Wyo. 1992)
("The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 8(e)(2)
is identical in both.").
194. See FaD. R. CIrv. P. 8(e)(2); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-008.E(2). Rule 8(e)(2) is intended to promote the
presentation of all relevant factual and legal theories and the final resolution of all disputes between the same
parties in a single judicial proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. G & H Mach., 92 F.R.D. 465, 467 (S.D. Ill. 1981)
("Thus, the pleader may... set forth inconsistent legal theories... without being forced to select a single theory
on which to seek recovery."); Glover, 824 P.2d at 556 (allowing two sets of facts to be alleged). A similar purpose
underlies a number of other procedural rules, including those permitting plaintiffs to pursue alternative relief
against multiple defendants in a single action. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (permissive joinder of parties); N.M.
R. Civ. P. 1-020.A. (permissive joinder of parties). These rules also contemplate the assertion of "alternative and
inconsistent claims." See Brown v. United States, 976 F.2d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 1992). The goal is to promote "the
adjudication of all phases of litigation involving the same parties in one action." Prager v. Prager, 80 N.M. 773,
776, 461 P.2d 906, 909 (1969).
195. See, e.g., In re BCD Corp., 119 F.3d 852,858 (10th Cir. 1997) ("ThenthCircuit... has rejected the
doctrine of judicial estoppel as being inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... );
Bates v. Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028, 1038 n.3 (2d Cir. 1993) (observing that "the Tenth Circuit has rejected
the doctrine of judicial estoppel" on the ground that it is "inconsistent with the spirit of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2)').
196. See Plumer, supra note 7, at 417 ("A clear majority of the circuits considering the question view the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a bar against using judicial estoppel in federal court.").
197. 78 N.M. 36,428 P.2d 10 (1967).
198. 86 N.M. 399, 524 P.2d 1015 (Ct. App. 1974), overruled on other grounds by Three Rivers Land Co.
v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240 (1982).
199. See PlatcoCorp., 78 N.M. at 37,428 P.2d at 11. The defendant had contended that the plaintiff should
have been required to "assert and rely on either one, but not both, of his positions." Id.
200. The case actually involved Rule 1-008.E(2)'s statutory predecessor, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1(8)(e)
(1953). See PlatcoCorp., 78 N.M. at 37, 428 P.2d at 11.
201. ld; cf Honaker v. Ralph Pool's Albuquerque Auto Sales, 74 N.M. 458,464,394 P.2d 978,982 (1964)
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Court of Appeals in turn relied on Platco to hold that the plaintiffs' previous action
to recover damages from one of the defendants for fraud in the inducement of a
contract did not prevent them from suing the defendants for specific performance
of the same contract,' because parties are permitted to pursue inconsistent claims
under Rule 8(e)(2). °3
Although Platco and Buhler involved the election of remedies doctrine,2" rather
than judicial estoppel, 5 the doctrines' similarity' suggests that Rule 8(e)(2) also
limits the application of judicial estoppel in New Mexico.' The plaintiffs in Platco
and Buhler did not prevail on their initial assertions,' however, and so those cases
do not preclude application of the majority view of judicial estoppel-the prior
success rule-in cases in which a party has taken inconsistent positions in
successive proceedings.2 9

(citing Rule 8(e)(2) in concluding that "in an original complaint or in an amended complaint a party may plead
inconsistent claims").
202. See Buhler, 86 N.M. at 401,524 P.2d at 1017. The New Mexico Court of Appeals has stated:
[C]ourts ordinarily do not grant damages in addition to specific performance, in large part
because such an award would constitute an inequitable windfall for the promisee, at least where
specific performance alone of the contract affords the promisee the full benefit of his bargain.
By its very nature, a suit for specific performance affirms the contract and seeks that it be
enforced. The [promisee] is not due both specific performance of the contract and damages for
its breach.
McCoy v. Alsup, 94 N.M. 255, 262, 609 P.2d 337, 344 (Ct. App. 1980) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
203. See Buhler, 86 N.M. at 401-02 524 P.2d at 1017-18. This analysis was disputed by at least one member
of the court, who concluded that the rule "does not allow one to plead inconsistent claims in separate suits." Id. at
404, 524 P.2d at 1020 (Hemandez, J., specially concurring). Another member concluded that the rule permitted
the assertion of "multiple claims in a single action." Id. at 403, 524 P.2d at 1019 (Hendley, J., concurring).
204. The doctrine of "election of remedies" requires parties to choose between "one of two or more existing
remedies" because "the use of one remedy precludes pursuing the other." Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98
N.M. 690, 693,652 P.2d 240, 243 (1982) (overuling Buhler and concluding that election of remedies is a defense
in New Mexico), overruled by Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 728 P.2d 467 (1986) (focusing on
res judicata issues). The doctrine's underlying purpose is to discourage "multiple litigation of causes of action
arising out of the same subject matter." Id at 693, 652 P.2d at 243 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
205. See generally Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409,421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (stating that "[e]lection
of remedies is an application of the doctrine of estoppel," although "[s]trictly speaking.... it is not a judicial
estoppel"), overruled by Cypress Creek Util. Serv. Co. v. Muller, 640 S.W. 2d 860 (Tex. 1982) (focusing on
negligence issues).
206. See Butcher v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 850 F.2d 247, 248 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[e]lection of
remedies and judicial estoppel are closely related doctrines"); Windsor v. Strasburger & Price LLP., No. 05-9400698-CV, 1995 WL 437186, at *4 (Tex. App. July 19, 1995) ("Election of remedies is a type of judicial
estoppel.").
207. See, e.g., Scioto Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n v. Price Waterhouse & Co., No. 90AP-1 124, 1993 WL 531298,
at "14 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1993) ("[J]udicial estoppel is ... a broad-sweeping doctrine similar to ... the
doctrine of election of remedies, which ... was abolished by [the rule] which permits alternative pleading."), affid
in partand rev'd in part, 659 N.E.2d 1268 (Ohio 1996). In fact, the Tenth Circuit has relied on Rule 8(e)(2) to
reject the election of remedies doctrine. See Bernstein v. United States, 256 F.2d 697, 706 (10th Cir. 1958). It has
also used it to reject judicial estoppel. See Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432,437-38 (10th Cir. 1956).
208. See Platco Corp. v. Shaw, 78 N.M. 36, 37, 428 P.2d 10, 11 (1967) (indicating that the plaintiff's
allegedly inconsistent positions were taken while the case was still in the pleading stage). Likewise in Buhler, the
court in the previous action had "resolved all issues" against the party who was seeking to take a position
inconsistent with one it had taken in the earlier action. Buhler, 86 N.M. at 401, 524 P.2d at 1017.
209. See Paschke v. Retool Indus., 519 N.W.2d 441,444 n.4 (Mich. 1994) (indicating that the prior success
rule "allow[s] for alternative pleadings"). See also Hrudka v. Hrudka, 919 P.2d 179, 187 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(concluding that "a party that is unsuccessful with the first position asserted thereafter may take an alternative
position"); Plumer, supra note 7, at 420 n.76 (concluding that judicial estoppel does not preclude inconsistencies
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While no New Mexico court has specifically addressed this issue, a number of
other courts have concluded that the judicial estoppel doctrine does not conflict
with Rule 8(e)(2) where the majority view is followed.2 1 ° In City of Kingsport v.
Steel & Roof Structure, Inc.,2" for example, the Sixth Circuit indicated that Rule
8(e)(2) does not preclude the application of judicial estoppel if the doctrine applies
only where a party was successful in its earlier assertion and then changed its
position in subsequent litigation." In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer,1 3 a federal
district court likewise concluded that judicial estoppel does not conflict with the
right to plead inconsistent claims under Rule 8(e)(2) if the party invoking the
doctrine must show that the contrary position previously asserted by its opponent
was actually accepted by a court.2" 4
In addition, members of the New Mexico judiciary have suggested that Rule
8(e)(2) does not preclude application of the majority view of judicial estoppel by
interpreting the rule to permit the assertion of alternative and inconsistent positions
only in a single proceeding.2"' The majority view of judicial estoppel, by contrast,
necessarily precludes the assertion of inconsistent positions only when a litigant has
asserted those positions in separate proceedings, 6 or perhaps occasionally (as in
the case of preliminary injunction proceedings) 1 7 when it has done so in
"successive stages" of the same proceeding.2
'
The conclusion that the majority view of judicial estoppel does not conflict with
Rule 8(e)(2) appears to be correct." 9 By permitting parties to assert inconsistent
positions within a single proceeding, 2' the majority view allows the alternative
pleading contemplated by Rule 8(e)(2)." Conversely, Rule 8(e)(2) does not appear
to preclude the application of judicial estoppel to bar the assertion of inconsistent
"at the pleading stage" because the doctrine should not apply "unless a litigant has benefited from a position").
210. See, e.g., Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1217-18 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1990) (concluding
that the majority view "does not clash with the right to plead inconsistent claims under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 8(e)(2)"
because it "allows parties to contradict themselves in court").
211. 500 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1974).
212. See id. at 619-20.
213. 823 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
214. See id. at 314.
215. See Buhler v. Marnajo, 86 N.M. 399, 404, 524 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Ct. App. 1974) (Hendley, J.,
concurring), overruled on other grounds by Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240
(1982). Justice Hernandez added that Rule 8(eX2) permits a party to plead inconsistent claims in "one lawsuit,"
but not in "separate suits." l at 405, 524 P.2d at 1020 (Hemandez, J., specially concurring); cf.Fay v. Federal
Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 647 N.E.2d 422,426 n.10 (Mass. 1995) (observing that Rule 8(e)(2) permits the assertion
of inconsistent positions "within a single proceeding").
216. See Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1548 (7th Cir. 1990);
Fay, 647 NE.2d at 426 n.10. However, the Tenth Circuit has stated that judicial estoppel can apply to "inconsistent
positions assumed in the course of the same judicial proceeding." In re Johnson, 518 F.2d 246, 252 (10th Cir.
1975).
217. See Murray v. Silberstein, 882 F.2d 61, 65-67 (3d Cir. 1989).
218. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 716 (10th Cir. 1993).
modified on other groundson reh'g en banc, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cit. 1994); Fay, 647 N.E.2d at 426 n.10.
219. See Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1217-18 n.3 (6th Cir. 1990) ("The doctrine of
judicial estoppel does not clash with the right to plead inconsistent claims under [Rule] 8(e)(2) .... [The majority
view of] judicial estoppel does not bar a party from contradicting itself, but from contradicting a court's
determination that was based on that party's assertion.").
220. See id. at 1218 (observing that the majority view "allows parties to contradict themselves in court').
221. See Astor Chauffeured, 910 F.2d at 1548 ("Applying judicial estoppel only if a party prevails in [the
first suit] on the basis of a position inconsistent with that latterly taken allows alternative pleadings ....
").
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positions in separate proceedings. 2' Thus, interpreting the judicial estoppel
doctrine to include a prior success requirement appears to strike the appropriate
balance between the competing policy goals underlying the judicial estoppel
doctrine and the liberal pleading practices contemplated by modem procedural
rules. 3
VI. CONCLUSION
2
The judicial estoppel doctrine is not universally accepted, ' primarily due to its
potential conflict with the liberal modem pleading practices authorized by Rule
8(e)(2) and other similar rules.' In fact, the doctrine has been rejected by a number
m
of state and federal courts' (including, at least at one time, the Tenth Circuit)' on
precisely this basis.' Abolition of the doctrine has also been advocated by some
commentators.229
23°
On the other hand, the doctrine has been described as a valuable restraint on
23' and
litigants "who would otherwise play 'fast and loose' with the legal system,,
232
it is clearly recognized by the state courts in New Mexico. The New Mexico

222. Discussing the election of remedies doctrine, one New Mexico appellate judge has observed that "Rule
8(e)(2)... [only] curtails the doctrine in its application to [inconsistent] claims in a single action." Buhler v.
Marrujo, 86 N.M. 399,403, 524 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Ct. App. 1974) (Hendley, J., concurring), overruled by Three
Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240 (1982). Given the similarity between judicial estoppel
and election of remedies, see supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text, it is not surprising that them is some
analytical overlap. In addition, judicial estoppel and Rule 8(e)(2) appear to work well together. See Eric A.
Schreiber, Comment, The JudiciarySays, You Can'tHave It Both Ways: JudicialEstoppel-A DoctrinePrecluding
Inconsistent Positions,30 LoYoLA LA. L REv. 323,333 n.74 (1996) ("Since Rule 8(e)(2) only applies within the
pleadings of a lawsuit, there is no danger or fear of prior inconsistent statements reaching the court, except those
that should be barred by a correct application of judicial estoppel.").
223. See Paschke v. Retool Indus., 519 N.W.2d 441,444 nA (Mich. 1994) (noting that the judicial estoppel
doctrine's prior success requirement is "tailored to allow for alternative pleadings"); Schreiber, supra note 222,
at 336 ("[O]f all the existing forms ofjudicial estoppel ... , the prior success rule comes closest to fulfilling the
policy goals ofjudicial estoppel.").
224. See generally Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579 (Fed. Cit. 1984)
("Because of the absence of defined principles, the doctrine has been criticized, as it [involves] basically an 'ad
hoc' decision in each case.").
225. See Bates v. Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028,1038 n.3 (2d Cir. 1993) (observing that the inconsistency
between the judicial estoppel doctrine and the federal rule has led to rejection of the doctrine); see also Total
Petroleum, Inc. v. Davis, 822 F.2d 734,737 n.6 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[Ihe doctrine is not followed in a majority of
jurisdictions, partly because of its vague definition and partly because of a perceived conflict with the rule allowing
parties to plead alternative legal theories.") (citation omitted).
226. See, e.g., Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("We conclude that the judicial
estoppel doctrine has no vitality in this jurisdiction."); Miramon v. Woods, 639 So. 2d 353, 358 (La. Ct, App.
1994) (noting that "judicial estoppel is not applicable in Louisiana"); Scioto Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n v. Price
Waterhouse & Co., No. 90AP-1 124,1993 WL 531298, at *16 (Ohio CL App. Dec. 21, 1993) (observing that "Ohio
has not adopted the doctrine of judicial estopper'), affd in part and rev'd in part, 659 N.E.2d 1268 (Ohio 1996);
see also Plough Inc. v. National Academy of Sciences, 530 A.2d 1152, 1159 n.10 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987) (stating
that judicial estoppel "has as yet enjoyed no vitality at all in the District of Columbia") (authority and internal
quotation marks omitted); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp. 834 F.2d 208, 215 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[l~t
remains an open question whether the Massachusetts courts would employ judicial estoppel.").
227. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1520 n.10 (10th Cir. 1991).
228. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
229. See Henkin, supra note 10.
230. See Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 266 S.W. 313, 317 (Tenn. 1924).
231. Paschke v. Retool Indus., 519 N.W.2d 441,444 (Mich. 1994).
232. See supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
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federal courts appear to be increasingly receptive to the doctrine as well.233 Thus,
the focus in future judicial estoppel cases arising in the state and federal courts of
New Mexico is not likely to be on whether the doctrine is recognized,' but on how
it should be interpreted.235
With respect to the latter issue, there is some question, both in New Mexico and
elsewhere, as to whether judicial estoppel can be invoked by one who was not a
party to the litigation in which a prior inconsistent position was taken.236 While
most courts faced with this question have concluded that strangers to the prior
litigation can invoke the doctrine,"' the Tenth Circuit has expressed a contrary view
on at least one occasion.2 3 Because the doctrine is primarily intended to protect
courts (as opposed to litigants) from manipulation,239 the conclusion that the
doctrine can be invoked by one who was not a party to the prior proceeding appears
to be the preferable interpretation.'
The principal remaining debate" concerns whether the prior inconsistent
position must have been successfully maintained in order for the doctrine to
apply. 2 The majority view holds that prior judicial success is a prerequisite to the

233. See supra notes 91-113 and accompanying text.
234. But see Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 716 (10th Cit. 1993)
(declining to decide "whether the doctrine applies in the Tenth Circuit"), modified on other grounds on reh 'g en
banc, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cit. 1994); cf.Henkin, supra note 10, at 1739 n.185 (observing that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has shown "a willingness to consider overturning its long-standing policy of permitting judicial
estoppel, in light of changes to the Oklahoma Pleading Code which [brought] the code more in line with the federal
rules." (citing Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 786 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1990))).
235. See generally Young v. United States Dep't of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The
circumstances under which the doctrine could be applied are far from clear."); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General
Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987) ('"he specific requirements [of the doctrine] are rather vague and
vary from state to state and from circuit to circuit.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
236. See supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Boyers, supra note 16, at 1259 (observing that "most federal jurisdictions explicitly have
rejected... a [privity] requirement"). But see Ezzone v. Hansen, 474 N.W.2d 548, 550 (Iowa 1991) ("[A]lthough
statements describing the judicial estoppel doctrine pay lip service to its application in the absence of privity
between the party seeking to invoke it and the former litigation, some form of privity has in fact existed in most
cases in which the doctrine has been successfully invoked.") (discussing Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp.,
747 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
238. See Reno v. Beckett, 555 F.2d 757, 770 (10th Cir. 1977) (applying Kansas law).
239. See Deeks, supra note 11, at 873 (observing that judicial estoppel is "concerned far more with the court
system than with the individual litigants").
240. See id at 873 n.2 ("[Equitable estoppel requires the party invoking the doctrine to have been an adverse
party in a prior proceeding and to have relied on her opponent's earlier position. Such limitations would not be
appropriate for judicial estoppel, which is concerned with the relationship between the litigant and the judicial
system.") (citations omitted).
241. Some less frequently litigated judicial estoppel issues have not been discussed in this article because
they have yet to be addressed by the New Mexico courts. As some were delineated by one court:
The following additional limitations [on the doctrine's application] have been stated in various
opinions: applies only to reversal on factual issues; must involve sworn statement; must be
before the same court; ... must be same litigation, i.e., no reversal between trial and appeal or
between consolidated cases; can be avoided unless fraudulent; must be inconsistent not
alternative positions, i.e., assert A for one purpose and B for another purpose.
Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1579 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
242. There is likewise some debate over the extent to which the party invoking the doctrine must have been
prejudiced by the prior inconsistent position. See supra notes 167-88 and accompanying text. However, that issue
is closely related to the "prior success" issue. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text. There is no question
that, in New Mexico, prejudice (at a minimum) is an important consideration in analyzing judicial estoppel
arguments. See Johnson v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 117 N.M. 697, 699, 875 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Ct. App. 1994).
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application of the doctrine, 3 while the minority view holds that it is not a
requirement.2' It may be possible to reconcile New Mexico's liberal pleading rules
with either majority or minority view by limiting application of the doctrine to the
assertion of inconsistent positions in separate proceedings, 5 or at least to cases in
which a party has changed its position (as opposed to merely pleading in the
alternative). 2 " However, New Mexico courts clearly favor the majority view,
which is easier to reconcile with the principles underlying the rules. 2
There are other valid reasons for favoring the majority view, among which is the
simple fact that it is narrower 2" and more precise than the minority view.' Judicial
estoppel is a harsh 251 and relatively obscure doctrine 25 2 that is likely to be applied
only when the equities clearly militate in favor of doing so. 253 This situation is 'far
2
more likely to be the case where the "possibility of inconsistent results exists 5
and inconsistent results are possible only where the prior inconsistent position was
judicially accepted. 25 These considerations, and in particular the importance of the
principles underlying modem liberal pleading practices,256 suggest that New

243. See supra note 28. See also supranotes 114-28 and accompanying text (discussing majority view of
prior success requirement).
244. See supra note 28. See also supra notes 129-42 and accompanying text (discussing minority view of
prior success requirement).
245. See, e.g., AFN, Inc. v. Schlott, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 219, 227 & n.12 (D.NJ. 1992) (distinguishing
between "the intentional self-contradiction in separate legal proceedings" precluded by the minority view of judicial
estoppel and the "permissible practice" of pleading in the alternative); County of Stanislaus v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 170,782, at 73,313 (E.D. Cal., Aug. 25, 1994) ("Under the minority view, a litigant
plays 'fast and loose' by asserting one position and then contradicting it in another proceeding.") (emphasis
added).
246. See, e.g., Medicare Rentals, Inc. v. Advanced Servs., 460 S.E.2d 361, 364 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995)
("Judicial estoppel... requires at a minimum that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted intentionally have
changed its position in order to gain an advantage."); Barr v. Dramatists Guild, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 555, 560
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Judicial estoppel is not applicable [to the alternative pleading penmitted by Rule 8(eX2)] because
pleadings framed in an alternative or hypothetical manner do not involve a change of position.").
247. See supra note 28. See also supranotes 44-51 and accompanying text (discussing New Mexico courts'
view of prior success requirement).
248. See Paschke v. Retool Indus., 519 N.W.2d 441, 444 n.4 (Mich. 1994) (observing that "the 'prior
success' model is more narrowly tailored to allow for alternative pleadings"); see also supra notes 208-23 and
accompanying text (discussing impact of modem pleading rules on majority view of prior success requirement).
249. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703,716 (9th Cir. 1990) (observing that
"[tihe minority view is more broad"); AFN, Inc., 798 F. Supp. at 225 (referring to the minority approach as "the
broader view of the doctrine"); USLIFE Corp. v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 560 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Tex. 1983)
(describing the minority view as "more expansive").
250. See Decks, supra note 11, at 879 ("The parameters of the [minority view] are more vague than those
of the [prior] success test ....).
251. See Menominee Indian Tribe v. Thompson, 943 F. Supp. 999, 1022 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Medicare
Rentals, Inc. v. Advanced Servs., 460 S.E.2d at 364.
252. See United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993).
253. See USLIFE Corp., 560 F. Supp. at 1306; cf Scott v. Land Span Motor, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1115, 1119
(D.S.C. 1991) ("The doctrine... is an extraordinary one which should be applied with caution .. ")(citations
omitted).
254. See USLUFE Corp., 560 F. Supp. at 1306.
255. See Arizona v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 305 (Ariz. 1996), cert.denied, 519 U.S. 1128 (1997); see also
Deeks, supra note 11, at 877 (noting that "ifthe litigant's first position failed to gain an advantage for the litigant,
then there is no risk of inconsistent results between the first and second proceeding").
256. See Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428, 1434 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing the importance
of Rule 8(e)(2)).
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Mexico's adherence to the prior success requirement is appropriate,257 although the
doctrine may need some further clarification in the future.25

257. See generally Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Requiring prior
judicial acceptance protects the truth-seeking function of the court, while preserving the court's integrity."); Deeks,
supra note 11, at 877 ("The [prior] success test allows courts to protect themselves when they feel that their
integrity is threatened, while ensuring that the doctrine is not overused to the detriment of litigants.").
258. See supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which New Mexico courts appear
to have applied variations of the minority view).

